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INTRODUCTION
I am privileged to have been invited to give this the Tenth
Vernon Clancey Memorial Lecture. Vernon Clancey
achieved a world-wide reputation as an investigator of
incidents including ® res and explosions. He was involved in
the investigation of aircraft sabotage cases in the 1950s and
60s. Althoughmy talk is only partly concernedwith aircraft,
the painstaking forensic skills developed by scientists like
Clancey have been used to unravel the mysteries of fatigue
failures. I am somewhat apprehensive becausemy invitation
came from the Vice Chancellor, Professor Raoul Franklin. I
last saw him, but doubtless he only saw me in a sea of faces,
when he lectured to Engineering undergraduates at the
University of Oxford in the late 1960s. Faults in my lecture
today are, of course, due to my own inadequacies, and no
blame should be attached to my former lecturers, whom I
fear were dealing with unwilling material. In the years in
question, studentswere revolting,O tempora! O mores!, and
Engineering Science was not at the top of my priorities. I
have spent the last 30 years trying to catch up. I aim in this
lecture to give a broad overview of the problems of fatigue
in all modes of transport. Given the huge scope of my
canvas, the brush strokes will be thin to those members of
the audience who are knowledgeable about fatigue. To
assist the audience who are unaware of the basic facts of
fatigue, I will give brief explanations of salient facts at
appropriate points in the lecture, but in the interests of
continuity, will relegate these to an Appendix in the written
version of the paper.
I intend to review transport on land, sea and air, and to
begin with trains, not only because they are my current
research interest but historically, the introduction of
railways led to the ® rst recognition of the fatigue problem.
LAND TRANSPORT
Railways: Vehicles
The Industrial Revolutionwas powered by steam engines.
In order to provide the strength necessary for high speeds of
moving parts and high pressures in boilers, iron components
were rapidly substituted for the wooden parts of earlier
machines. The stresses to which these metals were subjected
were much higher than stresses induced in earlier, slower
machines. As the railways developed from 1830 on, so
reports of breakages of key parts became more common.
The ® rst railway accident involving major loss of life
occurred on the line from Paris to Versailles in 1842. About
70 peoplewere killed, including the French circumnavigator
Admiral D’ Urville, the discoverer of the statue of Venus de
Milo. The cause of this accident, which was a sensational
event widely reported throughout Europe, was the breaking
of the axle of one of the two engines hauling the train. The
engines and ¯ imsy wooden carriages fell into a smashed
heap and were set alight by the spilt hot coals from the
locomotives’ ® res. The carriages were locked, thus blocking
the escape for the unfortunate passengers.
The investigations into the causes of this axle failure
mark the beginnings of the investigation of fatigue failures.
It was noted that fracture surface was smooth and the idea
that the metal had suddenly tired (hence the term `fatigue’ )
and changed its internal structure causing immediate failure
was a common view. Many other failures followedÐ of
wheels, more axles, connecting rods, boilers, rails and
bridges. The latter failures caused a Commission of Enquiry
to be held in Britain, investigating the suitability of iron as a
structural material. Famous experiments on a heroic scale
were conducted by engineers such as Fairbairn and
Hodgkinson, who discovered that a weight of one third
that which was necessary to cause failure of a large beam on
a single application, could eventually cause failure of the
beam if applied on and off many times. This is the empirical
manifestation of fatigue: the failure of a material due to the
repeated application of cyclic loads at levels less than the
static failure load. Originally investigations were con® ned
to metals, indeed the words `metal’ and `fatigue’ are
intimately linked, but non-metals also suffer fatigue fracture
and this must be allowed for when, for example, plastics,
composites and rubbers are used in designs.
The ® rst systematic research into fatigue was conducted
by WoÈ hler, working for the German State Railways in the
1860s. He used small samples of axle material and devised a
machine which would reproduce on these samples the
stresses caused by the rotation of the full-sized railway
axles. He established an experimental relationship between
the size of the applied stress cycles and the number of
repetitions the material could withstand (the so-called S/N
curve, see the Appendix); he drew attention to the
importance of local areas of high stress, that is regions of
stress concentration (for example, between the axle and the
press ® tted wheel) and he identi® ed a cyclic stress level
below which the material could apparently resist an in® nite
number of repetitions, the `fatigue limit’ . Thus emerged the
® rst rule of design to avoid fatigue failure: keep the cyclic
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stresses below the fatigue limit. (After years of careful
study, we now know that fatigue is a highly localized
phenomenon involving the growth of a crack from a region
of high stress. The initiation, or birth, of the crack can be
in¯ uenced by very small-scale features such as a scratch or
surface ® nish and is therefore particularly dif® cult to
predict. Once the crack has developed in length through a
micro to a macro crack, prediction of its rate of growth is
relatively much more straightforward.)
Over the years, experience has been accumulated which
has allowed trains to be designed in a robust way and, in
general, rail vehicles have proved capable of operating
safely for many years: 30 years is a nominal design life, but
50 or even 60 years usage has been common. This means
that reserves of strength have been built into the design and
fatigue problems have been rare and are hardly ever generic.
Axles still break (see Table 1), bearings occasionally fail,
but generally the fatigue problem can be said to have been
contained. However, modern design pressures have led to
the concept of light-weighting, which is particularly
important for high speed trains, now travelling at around
300 km/h. Changes from steel to aluminium and even
composite materials, has led to some cracking problems.
The airtight cars of the Japanese Skinkansen provide an
interesting example. These cars must be pressure-tight to
avoid uncomfortable pressure pulses as trains pass at high
speeds in tunnels: the major cause of retirement of the
vehicle is loss of airtightness due to fatigue cracking from
fastener holes. In high speed systems, great care is taken to
inspect wheels or axles for growing cracks (a technique in
principle, similar to, but in practice more sophisticated than
the wheel-tapping which will be remembered by older
readers!). Inspection intervals of say 400,000km are
common, after which the wheelset is dismantled and
inspected by magnetic or ultrasonic methods. One com-
pany’ s records indicate that out of 15,000 such inspections
annually, no fatigue cracks were found, but 1.4% of the
axles examined had to be scrapped because of damage
caused by the dismantling. This ’ inspection after a service
interval’ is expensive and largely inef® cient. It is a current
aim to inspect and maintain based on knowledge of
actual condition, so in many branches of engineering
the development of appropriate sensors by which
plant condition can be continuously monitored is a top
priority.
Railways: Infrastructure
Railway vehicles contact the infrastructure through their
wheels and at current collection points for electric
locomotives, a third rail or via overhead wires. All contacts
lead to locally high stresses and potential failures by fatigue
and/or wear. In the case of rails, fatigue failure remains a
rather dif® cult problem.
Heavy freight traf® c causes rapid rail wear; a particular
problem in the USA where freight movement is more
important than passenger traf® c. Table 1 illustrates that rail
failures are still numerous. The data is from the UK and is
subject to some causes of uncertainty, particularly de® nition
and reporting standards over the hundred plus years of the
time span. However, it is clear that whilst failures of wheels
and axles have reduced by a factor of 20 over the last
century, failures of rails per train kilometre have actually
increased by a factor of more than 2. Heavier axle loads,
more axles/train and the move to all-welded track have all
contributed to these ® gures. Because the consequences of
failure can be severe, much effort and cost is expended in
detecting, monitoring and repairing cracks in railway lines.
A quantitative understanding of the mechanisms and
mechanics of fatigue failure of cracks in regions away
from joints in rails is still lacking. The problem is important
and the subject of active research in many countries. There
are now many examples of the organizational separation of
the infrastructure and train operations. The quanti® cation of
damage caused by particular vehicles, and therefore the
appropriate level of costing for track access which should be
applied, has assumed even greater importance because of
these changes. The deterioration of bridges with the passage
of both trains and time, has for many years been recognized
as an important problem. Many of the iron (and later steel)
bridges now in use were built more than 100 years ago.
Corrosion can be contained by painting (the famous stories
of the Forth Bridge indicate how time-consuming and
expensive this can be), but often a coat of paint is cosmetic,
and in crevices and corners of the structures, the joint effects
of corrosion and fatigue eat away into the structure. The use
of structural frequency response changes for the whole
structure, in order to detect cracks, is often not sensitive
enough to identify cracks in an early stage of life, and
because of accelerating growth rates as cracks become
longer, vital cracks can be missed on inspection, yet grow to
failure before the next inspection becomes due. Although
major failures of railway bridges due to fatigue have not
occurred for many years, the costs of inspections are high
and are becoming even higher as the age of our bridge stock
increases.
Automobiles
That the automobile has liberated and enriched the
opportunities which stem from the ability of the common
man to travel easily is a glorious achievement of this
century’ s engineering and production technology.However,
its very success in multiplying in an exponential fashion,
and concerns at the level of pollution produced by the
internal combustion engine, have led many people to realize
that the unbridled expansion of road transport cannot
continue.
The fact that cars are produced in such large numbers has
led to several important characteristics of their fatigue
design. Large amounts of money are available for research,
development and testing programmes. The car is a mature
product which has developed steadily in an evolutionary
way; new modi® cations can be tested in prototypes and
operated well ahead of actual service. As a result, one
might suggest that fatigue is not a major constraint to
the automobile industryÐ major components in engines,
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Table 1. Mechanical failures on UK railwaysÐ now and 100 years ago.
(Rates are per 106 train kilometres: various sources.)
1992±94 1881±90
Wheel or tyre 0.04 2.0
Axles 0.04 0.8
Rails 1.5 0.7
transmissions and suspensions rarely fail. Nevertheless,
considerable attention is paid to fatigue design and many
practical advances in general areas such as cumulative
damage due to random loadings, have stemmed from the
work of automobile manufacturers. The average motorist is
unlikely to experience fatigue failure of any major parts, but
may be unaware that the irritating failures of knobs, springs
and hinges, particularly those made from non-metallic
materials, are most likely due to fatigue. Pressures to reduce
the weight of cars have been a recent challengeÐ partly met
by the introduction of lighter materials (high-strength low-
alloy steels, plastics and composites), but also by the use of
increasingly sophisticated ® nite element stress analysis
which has allowed excess lightly stressed mass to be shaved
from components made from established materials. Since
the lifetime of cars is relatively short, corrosion has been a
limiting factor, but recent improvements have helped to
overcome this limitation.
The levels of maintenance required for modern cars are
astonishingly low compared with even 25 years agoÐ a
lesson which could be learned and applied to other areas of
the transport industry. An element of concern, however, is
the increasing electronic sophistication of modern vehicles
which in many cases defeats simple diagnosis and repair
when faults occur. Although solid state and ’ chip’ based
electronics are generally reliable, a major source of failure
is the thermal fatigue of soldered connections; an area
which is now the subject of active research worldwide
and a problem generic to equipment used in ® elds of
transport.
Infrastructure Damage Caused by Heavy Road Vehicles
Vehicles cause damage to the surface of the road on
which they pass. Continual passage of traf® c causes cyclic
loading, the damage accumulates and eventually the road
surface breaks up and needs to be repaired. The repair costs,
and the costs associated with delays to traf® c whilst repairs
are made are huge. The UK spent 1.17% of its GNP on roads
in 1990, of which 46% was spent on maintenance. Despite
the obvious economic consequences, the fatigue relation-
ships between traf® c quantity, axle loads and road surface
lifetime are little understood. A recent extensive review
suggested a fourth power law between axle load and damage
as a rule of thumb; the relationship may be an even higher
power law, but in any case illustrates the high sensitivity of
damage to the axle load. In recent years the overall weights
and axle loads of heavy lorries have increased considerably.
44 tonne lorries are commonplace throughoutEurope, as are
the sections of highway under repair caused by their
passage.
Bridges too are subject to cyclic loadings from traf® cÐ
on longer bridges the total weight of the vehicle is clearly
more important than the axle load. The severity of this
problem can be illustrated by a simple calculation. If a
bridge was designed for lorries of 10 tonnes and a 50 year
life, then for the same number of lorries of 44 tonnes, the life
will be reduced to 1.6 months if the fourth power law holds!
The UK is only halfway through what is a 15 year £1.3
billion programme to assess and strengthen the nation’s
100,000 bridges in preparation for the arrival, under a EU
directive, of 40 tonne trucks in 1999.
SEA TRANSPORT
Ships: The Unsolved Fatigue Problem
Recently, there has been a steep rise in the number of
large cargo ships lost at sea. In 1994, 15 of these massive
ships sank, killing 141 crew members. Over the last 12
years, 906 people have been lost when bulk carriers sank.
The scale of losses prompted the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency that
administers international conventions on safety at sea, to
hold a conference in London during May 1995, to consider
measures to improve safety at sea. The costs involved, apart
from loss of ships, cargo and lives, are huge. The Exxon
Valdez accident cost $1b in clean-up charges, a large
routine repair costs about 100,000 ECU and delays cost up
to 30,000 ECU/day. The costs of frequent inspections are
high, and often the inspections are by necessity super® cial.
The world’ s trade depends on cheap transport by sea; the
vessels used are often old and suffer from corrosion and
fatigue cracking, the value of the ship is often less than the
value of the cargo and, as always, time is money so that
loading and unloading operations are sometimes conducted
with undue haste and can induce damage into the ships’ hulls.
Why are losses of large ships so prevalent? Basically,
ships are large but extremely fragile welded structures. A
typical Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) is some 330m
long and 56m wide. The side plates are 18 to 20mm thick.
An egg is about 48mm wide and its shell some 0.35mm
thickÐ that is, the thickness to width is of the order 1/140,
relatively some 20 times thicker than the corresponding
VLCC ratio of 1/2800. Given the huge mass of a loaded
VLCC, it can easily be imagined that a ’ gentle’ impact with
a dock side can cause severe indentation damage. A ship is
often divided into six huge holds: if the cargo is loaded
unevenly into the holds, large bending stresses can result. In
recent years some ships have been instrumented to assist the
Master to control the stresses induced by loading. However,
many owners cut costs to a minimum. A driver or walker
can now be equipped with a Global Positioning Satellite
navigationsystem for a few hundred pounds, but many ships
do not carry such equipment! Modern ships are constructed
by welding large plates and girders into a structure. The total
length of weld in a VLCC runs into several hundred
kilometres, often originally made in the shipyard under
dif® cult conditions leading to misalignment and poor
quality control. Inspection in service is dif® cult because of
the size of the structures involved and hampered by poor
accessibility. In addition, and vitally important, ships’ hulls
have traditionally been designed to Codes based on static
loads and without consideration of fatigue loadings of either
the high cycle type caused by wave action or the low cycle
type caused by uneven loadings.When the hostile corrosion
conditions in which ships work are then taken into account,
it should come as no surprise to learn that ships suffer
structural deteriorationwith ageÐ deteriorationwhich often
goes unnoticed until a large-scale failure occurs.
The largest British ship lost at sea was the MV
Derbyshire, a bulk carrier 294m long and 44m wide, with
a displacement of 192,000 tonnes. In 1980 the Derbyshire
disappeared without sending a distress call in a storm in the
Philippine sea. Many theories have been put forward to
account for the sudden loss, but several centre round sudden
catastrophic failure caused by fractures running from
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fatigue cracks in the area just ahead of the stern super-
structure. A somewhat inconclusive inquiry was held, which
prompted a report which discussed the unpredictability of
fatigue cracking in large ships, included the comments:
`We despair of ever estimating the fatigue life of a ship with
any accuracy. Our reasons for pessimism include:
(1) Uncertainty about material.
(2) Impossible to predict fatigue properties.
(3) Corrosion.
(4) Welding not perfect.
(5) Residual stress in hull.
(6) Stress concentrations.
(7) Mean stress effects not fully understood.
(8) Stress states at all points impossible to predict.
(9) Impossible to determine entire stress history at every
point.
(10) Crack detection very dif® cult.
(11) Brittle fracture during lifetime.
The truth is that ships do crack and cracks grow’ .
In August 1996, it was announced that the wreckage of
the Derbyshire had been located at a depth of 4200m some
1000 miles south-east of Japan. A later expedition secured
some remarkable photographs of the wreckage and early in
1998, the Government announced that the public inquiry in
the ship’ s loss would be re-opened later this year.
This comprehensive list serves to indicate the large
number of `unknowns’ still associated with fatigue in ships’
structures. However, the author’ s attention has recently
been drawn to fatigue design standards for ships produced
by Lloyd’ s Register together with a Fatigue Design
Assessment procedure, which appears to be considerably
in advance of any previous proposals.
This review would be incomplete without a mention of
losses of passenger ships. In general, the problems here arise
not from structural failures: the ships are smaller, better
maintained and generally newer. At the time this paper was
originally written, news broke of a ferry loss on Lake
Victoria, Tanzania with 500 feared drowned, probably
caused, as many other accidents have been, by over-
crowding. Even in heavily regulated European waters,
tragedies have occurred. In 1987 the Herald of Free
Enterprise capsized in Zeebrugge harbour, most probably
because of sloppy operating practices induced by cost-
cutting management policies. But the loss of the Estonia in
the Baltic sea, in 1994, may have been due to excessive sea
loadings on fatigue-cracked bolts securing the bow door,
used to allow vehicles to enter the loading decks. Both cases
have prompted discussions of the poor stability of roll-on/
roll-off ferries when water enters the vehicle decks.
Of all the transport industries, shipping is probably the
`lowest tech’ , but it is interesting to recall that two of the
most signi® cant theoretical advances in fatigue and fracture
arose out of studies of ships. In 1913 a famous paper on
stress concentrations was published in the Transactions of
Naval Architects by Inglis; he was studying the stress round
cut-outs and portholes in ships hulls. This work was used
later in 1921 by Grif® th to formulate his famous energy
balance approach to fracture instability. The numerous
brittle fractures of Liberty ships during World War II led to
the intensive study of the effect of welding and low
temperatures on the fracture of mild steel plates and
arguably to increased interest in fracture research and the
development of sharp crack fracture mechanics.
AIR TRANSPORT
Aircraft: Keeping Fatigue at Bay by Inspection
Aircraft are designed in such a way as to minimize their
structural mass. The consequences of failure are usually
severe. The failures of the pressure hulls of the early Comet
aircraft in the 1950s prompted much research which
contributed to the development of quantitative under-
standing of fatigue crack growth, particularly in aluminium
alloys. A modern aircraft is a complex system and failure of
apparently insigni® cant parts can lead to catastrophic loss: a
classic case was the crash of a DC-10 on take-off from
Chicago on 25 May 1979. A bolt in the engine pylon/wing
attachment bracket failed by fatigue. During the subsequent
investigation the world’ s ¯ eet of DC-10 aircraft was
grounded, to await changes in maintenance techniques
which overcame the problem, which was caused by loads
generatedby incorrect ® tting of the enginepods to thewings.
At the time of this accident about one ® fth of the world’ s jet
passengers was being carried by aircraft of this type.
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that fatigue is a
major limitation on the safe operation of aircraft. A recent
survey indicated that:
· Only 2% of plane crashes are caused by structural failure;
· 7% by de® ciencies in maintenance;
· 11% by terrorism or military action;
· 12% by weatherÐ thunder and lightning, ice, fog, wind
shear, etc;
and a vast proportion, 67%, are caused by human errorÐ by
pilots, aircrew and air traf® c controllers.
A further report suggested the following ® gures for the
relative frequency of occurrence of different types of failure
mechanisms in structural failures in civil aircraft. Fatigue,
(47%) predominated, but stress corrosion (16%), corrosion
(27%) and corrosion fatigue (10%) failures often occurred.
It was suggested that the recti® cation of corrosion damage
in military and civil aircraft consumed more effort than the
repair of fatigue cracking. (The statistics for helicoptersgive
a rather different picture. Failures in the highly stressed
mechanical transmission system lead to sudden loss of
airworthiness and accident rates are greater on a passenger
kilometre basis.)
Why then, despite the obvious dif® culties, do fatigue
failures contribute so little to the loss of aircraft? The
industry is subjected to very tight regulation which is, in the
main, strictly enforced. Aircraft are subject to a range of
inspections designed to detect cracks before they grow to
dangerous sizes. Repair and replacement techniques have
been de® ned and in critical parts such as engines, strip-down
inspection and replacement is performed which has reduced
failures to low levels. The situation is different for military
aircraft where operational lives are much shorter than for
civil aircraft, ¯ ight loadings more severe and performance
criteria are more stringent. Expensive research programmes
to reduce fatigue damage in military aircraft have had
obvious spin-offs in the civil ® eld. Until recently many
national governments funded civil research in support of
their national aircraft industries.The trend has now turned to
international collaborationÐ the European Airbus is a good
example.
Overall therefore, resources have been available in the
aircraft industry to allow it to lead other branches of
transport in fatigue and fracture design. Economic pressures
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are beginning to force extensions to design lives for existing
aircraft and the weight problems associated with long-haul
fuel loads in large capacity aircraft are forcing the margins
of structural design to be lowered. Only by strict compliance
to high standards of safety-related regulation will the
aircraft industries’ impressive record in suppressing
structural failures be kept or even enhanced in the future.
THE RISK OF TRAVEL
The risk of travel has commonly been assessed in terms of
accidental deaths per 109 km travelledÐ see, for example,
Table 2. For rail travel it will be noted that there is an
increase in the most recent ® gures, which re¯ ects two major
accidents in that period: the King’ s Cross Underground ® re
and the Clapham Junction railway accident. For road travel
the risk will vary with many conditions (e.g., class of road,
experience of driver, weather, lighting, wearing a seat belt
or crash helmet, as well as type of vehicle). The reduction of
risk for car travel noted in Table 2 re¯ ects the introduction
of compulsory wearing of seat belts, greater enforcement of
drink-driving laws and the public attitudes to drink-driving,
improvements in car design, a greater mileage on motor-
ways, which have lower accident and casualty rates, and
slower traf® c in towns due to increasing congestion. For air
travel the risk per ¯ ight (or per sector of a ¯ ight) is arguably
more signi® cant than per 109 km travelled, as a substantial
proportion of all fatal accidents occur during take-off or
landing. The reduction in risk of air travel noted in Table 2
re¯ ects the improvement in reliability of aircraft and the
extensive use of automatic landing of aircraft with a
reduction of accidents due to pilot error.
Much work has been performed on aspects of the
quanti® cation of risk in recent years. In the ® eld of
transport, risks on public modes (rail, coach and aircraft)
are signi® cantly lower than in private modes (walking,
cycling and the automobile). The public expects to be safer
`when in someone else’ s care’ . Nevertheless, there remains
much to be done in educating the public of the link between
safety and cost: further improvements from current
acceptable levels of safety are generally costly (the gradient
of the safety level/cost curve is very shallow at the top end).
A major challenge of the public transport industry,
particularly acute in aircraft, is the need to at least sustain,
or better improve, safety and risk levels whilst at the same
time operating under more stringent economic conditions.
FUTURE THREATS
The main future threats which will increase the pressure
on designing against fatigue can be summarized as follows:
· The need for lighter structures which are more ef® cient at
higher speeds and have lower life-cycle costs because of
reduced maintenance levels;
· The need, for economic reasons, to squeeze more out of
existing plant by extending original design lives;
· Increasing complexity of engineering products which are
becoming `mechatronic’ systemsÐ that is, mixtures of
mechanical, electronic and computer components.
The ® rst pressure may require the introduction of new
materials or composite mixtures for which the fatigue
properties and failure mechanisms will have to be
determined. Advances in computational power are already
assisting in the design of lighter, more stress-ef® cient
components made from more traditional materials. The
prolongation of the lives of structures and machines,
together with the elimination of reduction of maintenance
periods, can only be safely achieved if all the modern tools
of fracture mechanics and crack growth behaviour are
understood and used at the design stage. The ® nal threat,
from the failure of electronic components, can and will, of
course, be matched by increasing knowledge of fatigue
failures on a size scale much smaller than that traditionally
studied. The real danger comes from the knock-on effects of
system failures and the need for robust fail-safe control
systems. This lecture has indicated how fatigue failures
have, in the main, been eliminated or controlled in various
transport applications. Human errors have been identi® ed as
a much more potent cause of accidents than structured
breakdown due to fatigue or other causes. The use of
advanced electronic and computer control systems will
reduce human error but, in the course of its introduction,
must not be allowed to increase the risk from system
failures.
APPENDIXÐ A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FATIGUE
Fatigue is the phenomenon of the growth of cracks in
materials. The essential feature is that the cracks are driven
by stresses of variable amplitude, which are sometimes
regular and cyclic, for example those due to the rotation of
axles, or in other cases may be of a more random nature like
the wave loading on a ship or the gusts of turbulence on an
aircraft wing. Although individually the driving stresses
may be small, if a suf® cient number are applied the crack
can grow to a large enough length to cause failure. The site
of the birth or initiation of the crack is highly localized, in a
region of stress concentration caused by a local change of
shape or a defect such as a surface scratch. It is easy to
produce, by experiment, a relationship between cyclic stress
amplitude and a number of cycles to cause failure. It is
however much more dif® cult to predict the location of the
fatigue critical site in a large and complex machine or
structure.
For many steels, it is found that a fatigue limit exists (see
Figure A1), and stress below this limit can be applied
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Table 2. Deaths per 109km travelled, UK.
1967±71 1972±76 1986±90
Railway Passengers 0.65 0.45 1.1
Passengers in scheduled
air services on UK airlines 2.3 1.4 0.23
Bus or coach drivers
and passengers 1.2 1.2 0.45
Car or taxi drivers
and passengers 9.0 7.5 4.4
Two-wheeled motor
vehicle driver
Two-wheeled motor 163.0 165.0 } 104.0
vehicle passengers 375.0 359.0 }
Pedal cyclists 88.0 85.0 50.0
Pedestrians * 110.0 105.0 70.0
*Based on a National Travel Survey (1985/86) ® gure of 8.7 km per person
per week.
Source: Department of Transport.
inde® nitely without failure. The simplest design technique
to avoid failure is to ensure that the highest local stresses are
below the fatigue limit. Unfortunately, aluminium alloys do
not have a fatigue limit.
In the last 40 years, considerable understanding has been
gained of the local internal mechanisms which drive cracks
and many designs now acknowledge the existence of cracks
and are based on quantifying how quickly cracks will grow
under service loadings. The techniques of `fracture
mechanics’ allow for inspection intervals to be set, based
on the size of crack which might reasonably be detected and
on how much it can grow between inspection intervals.
Experimentally determined fatigue crack growth laws can
be determined and their integration between critical and
® nal crack sizes is a relatively straightforward task. Figure
A2 is a generalized illustration of the importance of size-
scale to the fatigue problem. In particular, it shows that in
many cases a very high proportion of fatigue life is
consumed before cracks can be detected by any practical
means. This is the root of the mystery of fatigue failure:
apparently perfect performance preceding an unexpected
failure. The quanti® cation of service loads is virtually
important if fatigue assessments are to be made. The
important fatigue loads might be applied relatively
infrequentlyÐ for example, the pressurization of an aircraft
hull once per ¯ ight. During a ¯ ight, the disc of the turbine in
the aircraft’ s engine will have rotated millions of times and
will be subjected to a very different design methodology
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Figure A1. Typical stress/endurance curves.
Figure A2. Size scales of fatigue and fracture.
than the pressure hull. Loadings of a mechanical nature are
the primary causes of fatigue, but thermal stresses due to
temperature changes can also be important. The turbine disc
mentioned above will see an alternative of hot and cold
conditions during the ¯ ight. Electronic components are
susceptible to thermal stresses due to changing current ¯ ows
and cracks can be formed on soldered joints or at the
interfaces between wafers of material. Most electronic fails
by fatigue and thus system integrity of modern machines
and equipment depends on fatigue knowledge applied at the
microscopic scale of the electronic component parts.
POSTSCRIPT
In the period between the delivery of this lecture and the
return of the proofs from the publisher, two serious railway
accidents occurred which may have been caused by metal
fatigue problems and, at ® rst sight, may appear to be in
con¯ ict with the opinions expressed in the paper.
On June 3, a German Inter City Express (ICE) travelling
from MuÈ nchen to Hamburg derailed from 200km/h at
Eschede and smashed into an overbridge which collapsed
onto several telescoped carriages. In what proved to be
Germany’ s worst rail accident in 50 years, 100 passengers
were killed. On June 16, a London King’ s Cross to
Newcastle express, travelling at about 160km/h, partially
derailed at Sandy in Bedfordshire, but fortunately stayed
upright and came to a halt without major injuries to any
passengers. In both cases faults with wheels were suspected
of being the root causes, although investigations are
still under way and of® cial reports are being prepared.
Preliminary statements point to cracks in the tyre of a
resilient wheel in the ICE set, and to a star-shaped fatigue
crack growing from a bolt hole holding a balance weight
in the wheel of the British train. If this latter report is true,
it emphasizes yet again the vast gulf in knowledge
between researchers and practitioners. Both accidents
point to the continuing dif® culties of practical non-
destructive examination methods aimed at detecting
cracks in an early stage of their development.
The media coverage of the ® rst accident was intense in
the couple of days in the immediate aftermath. The author
was contacted for a television interview on why the accident
had happened before he had heard of the tragedy from any
other sources. He declined. The second case merited only a
few column inches in a couple of papers, but fate had been
kind and there was no chain reaction to cause a major
accident out of the initial failure, as had been the case in the
German accident. Inevitably some politicians were quick to
show their ignorance, coupled with their desire for
publicity; by calling for mandatory passenger lists and
seat belts. Even a supposedly sensible newspaper like The
Guardian, ran a leader which said, `trimming a few minutes
off the journey time is simply not worth the extra risk. In the
end, trains are not planes, and they should not pretend to be’ .
In fact, neither accident occurred at the highest speeds of
which the trains were designed for and neither happened on
special dedicated high-speed track. There is overwhelming
evidence that the travelling public will switch from other
transportation modes to high-speed trains, and thus reduce
the death toll arising from automobile use. Although the
number of fatalities in the German crash was high, it should
be seen in the context of the 8000 or so deaths which occur
on Germany’ s roads every year. High-speed trains on
dedicated tracks in Japan, France, Germany, Spain and Italy,
® tted with Automatic Train Control, having no level
crossings and with the latest infrastructure technology,
have carried billions of passengers and have not yet
produced a single casualty.
ADDRESS
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to Professor
R. A. Smith, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of
Shef® eld, Mappin Street, Shef® eld S1 3JD, UK.
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